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Court/T ribunal: United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
C ase: Leser v. Berridge
Date: December 28, 2011
W ritten by: Emma Telling
Background Information
The Respondent, Alena Berridge, moved to Denver from the Czech
Republic with her two children. The Petitioner, Max Joseph Leser, is her exhusband and father to both children. Leser sued Berridge for wrongful removal of
the two children under both the Hague Convention and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (³ICARA´).
In 1980, the Hague Conference, consisting of seventy-one states and the
European Union, created the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction. The purposes of the Hague Convention are to
ensure respect of custody agreements between the countries involved and to
secure the return home of children who are wrongfully removed from their proper
home country. Under the Hague Convention ArtiFOH  D FKLOG LV ³ZURQJIXOO\
UHPRYHG´ ZKHUH WKH UHPRYDO ³LV LQ EUHDFK RI ULJKWV RI FXVWRG\ DWWULEXWHG WR D
person . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
LPPHGLDWHO\EHIRUHWKHUHPRYDORUUHWHQWLRQ´ The United States Congress later
implemented the Hague Convention by passing ICARA. 46 U.S.C. 11601 11610.
In addition to the language of the Hague Convention, ICARA states that if such
wrongful removal occurs, a person may file a petition for return of the child in a
federal or state court in the place where the child is located.
Q uestion Presented
The issue in this appeal was whether the appellate court could grant any
relief where a district court granted a petition for the return of children to the
Czech Republic, based not on a finding of wrongful removal, but instead on the
SDUHQW¶V VWLSXODWLRQ WKDW WKH FKLOGUHQ ZRXOG UHWXUQ WR WKH FRXQWU\ RI KDELWXDO
residence for a custody hearing.
Procedural Posture
Petitioner filed a petition in the United State District Court for the District
of Colorado seeking return of his children to the Czech Republic pursuant to The
Hague Convention and ICARA. Both Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to the
fact that the Czech court was the court where all custody issues should be heard,
including whether Respondent had the right to relocate the children to the United
States. Respondent appealed and thereafter filed a motion to stay the judgment.
7KH'LVWULFW&RXUW¶V+ROGLQJ
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In the original suit for the return of the children to the Czech Republic, the
district court stated that it did not believe the real issue before the court was
whether Respondent had wrongfully removed the children to the United States,
but rather which court, the Czech Court or the United States court, should
interpret the custody orders. Because both parties agreed that the Czech Court
was the proper court to hear these issues, the district court ordered the children
returned to the Czech Republic for the hearing.
T he A ppellate &RXUW¶V$QDO\VLV
After reviewing the record, the appellate court first considered whether the
entire matter was moot. 5HVSRQGHQW¶V DUJXPHQW RQ DSSHDO was that the district
court erred LQ LVVXLQJ LWV ³VXPPDU\ MXGJPHQW´ RUGHU EHFDXVH 3HWLWLRQHU GLG QRW
meet his burden of proof that Respondent breached his rights of custody under
ICARA. Respondent contended that this issue was not moot because the Czech
couUWUHOLHGRQWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶V³ILQGLQJ´RIZURQJIXOUHPRYDO
In contrast, Petitioner argued that the district court did not err in granting
the petition in full based on the stipulation of the parties that the children would
return to the Czech Republic. Petitioner contended that because the Czech Court
was determining the underlying custody dispute, there was nothing left for the
district court to adjudicate. Petitioner made three arguments as to why the district
FRXUW¶s order granting his petition for return of the children was not an
adjudication. First, the Czech courts are the ones adjudicating whether
Respondent can relocate the children. Second, the Hague Convention does not
require an evidentiary hearing and Petitioner made his prima facie case of
wrongful removal in his pleadings. Third, Respondent failed to preserve any
affirmative defenses under ICARA, such as physical or psychological harm if the
children returned to the Czech Republic or the desire of the children not to return
to the Czech Republic.
The appellate court reasoned that the district court made no finding as to
wrongful removal, either implicitly or explicitly. Instead, the district court merely
granted the petition for return of the children based on the parentV¶VWLSXODWLRQWKDW
the Czech Republic was the proper venue for the custody hearing. Article III
OLPLWV DIHGHUDO FRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQWR FDVHV DQG FRQWURYHUVLHV7KHIHGHUDO FRXUW
must decide actual controversies by a judgment and not give opinions about moot
questions or abstract propositions. A case or controversy no longer exists when it
is impossible to grant any effectual relief. The district court order clearly stated
WKHFRXUW¶VEHOLHIWKDWQRGLVSXWHGLVVXHVH[LVWHGEHFDXVHRIWKHSDUWLHV¶VWLSXlation
to return the children to the Czech court. The district court order also says that
the children shall remain within the jurisdiction of the Czech court until directed
or authorized otherwise by such court. The language of the written order shows
tKDW WKHGLVWULFW FRXUWEDVHGLWVRUGHURQWKHSDUHQW¶VDJUHHPHQWWKDWWKHFKLOGUHQ
would return to the Czech Republic. Therefore, the district court made no actual
finding of wrongful removal, but rather stated in its order that no disputed issue
existed for that court to determine. Thus the appellate court determined that the
civil action was moot.
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The appellate court further disagreed ZLWK5HVSRQGHQW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH
case was not moot because a lower Czech court allegedly depended on the district
court order. However, this argument is wrong because The Hague Convention
Article 19 clearly states that a decision under this Convention concerning the
return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any
custody issues. Even LI D IRUHLJQ FRXUW PLVLQWHUSUHWV D 8QLWHG 6WDWHV &RXUW¶V
order, that incorrect reading does not revive a moot case or controversy.
5HVSRQGHQW¶VILQDODUJXPHQWwas that the United States district courts will
replace courts of appeal and become courts of last resort in ICARA actions. This
argument is false as parties retain two options in these cases. First a party could
file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) with the district court to
correct any alleged error in findings before appealing. Second, a respondent may
file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 to stay the district
FRXUW¶V MXGJPHQW. Here, Respondent did not take advantage of the first option.
Even though she did file a stay under Rule 8, the appellate court, not the district
court, made the ultimate decision not to issue a stay of judgment. Respondent
was incorrect in her argument that the district courts are becoming courts of last
resort.
Holding
The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the district
court opinion with orders to remand the case to the district court with instructions
to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

